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Abstract:  How does banks’ default risk affect the probability of default of non-finan-
cial businesses? The literature has addressed this question by focusing on the direct 
effects on the banks’ corporate customers – demonstrating the existence of bank-in-
duced increases in firms’ probabilities of default. However, it fails to consider the indi-
rect effects through the interfirm transmission of default risk along supply chains. Sup-
ply chain relationships have been shown to be a powerful channel for default risk con-
tagion. Therefore, the literature might severely underestimate the overall impact of bank 
shocks on default risk in the business economy. Our paper fills this gap by analyzing 
the direct as well as the indirect impact of banks’ default risk on firms’ default risk in 
the U.K. Relying on Input-Output tables, we devise methods that enable us to examine 
this question in the absence of microeconomic data on supply chain links. To capture 
all potential propagation channels, we account for horizontal linkages between the firm 
and its competitors in the same industry, and for vertical linkages, both between the 
firm and its suppliers in upstream industries and between the firm and its customers in 
downstream industries. In addition, we identify trade credit and contract specificity as 
significant characteristics of supply chains, which can either amplify or dampen the 
propagation of default risk. Our results show that the banking crisis of 2007-2008 af-
fected the non-financial business sector well beyond the direct impact of banks’ default 
risk on their corporate clients.  
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The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing recession have shown 
that bank distress can have significant effects on the real economy. Banks play an 
important role in providing credit to non-financial firms. Shocks to bank liquidity or 
balance sheet difficulties affect the real economy if firms cannot easily switch from 
bank credit to alternative sources of finance. This has been the focus of the vast 
literature on the bank lending channel. Less attention has been paid to the impact of 
bank distress on the probability of default of non-financial firms. Banks can affect the 
default risk of their clients in several ways, through the granting or denying of loans, 
the loan amounts, and other loan conditions (such as collateral requirements and 
covenants).  Bersch et al. (2020) dub this channel the bank risk channel. Using a sample 
of German firms, the authors find that a distressed bank bailout leads to a bank-induced 
increase in firms’ probabilities of default. The literature on the bank risk channel is 
sparse. In addition, it has focused on the direct effects on the banks’ corporate 
customers. It fails to consider the indirect effects through the interfirm transmission of 
default risk along supply chains. Supply chain relationships have been shown to be a 
powerful channel for default risk contagion. Therefore, shocks to the health of banks 
have the potential to set off a chain reaction along firms’ supply chains, starting with 
the direct effect they have on their corporate clients who depend on them for credit. As 
a result, the existing literature might severely underestimate the overall impact of bank 
distress on default risk in the non-financial business economy. Our paper fills this gap 
by analyzing the direct as well as the indirect impact of banks’ default risk on firms’ 
default risk.  
We focus on the U.K. economy over the period 2005-2014. U.K. banks were 
severely hit by the crisis of 2007-2008, culminating in the U.K. Government’s 
nationalization and part-nationalization of major U.K. banks. The financial distress of 
U.K. banks resulted in severe credit restrictions for many of their client firms, as the 
banks moved swiftly to shed risk by selling assets and withdrawing credit in an attempt 
to raise capital-to-asset ratios.5 Barnett and Thomas (2014) suggest that the majority of 
the decline in corporate lending in the U.K. was due to a contraction in supply rather 
 
5 Data from the Bank of England show that the annual growth rate in corporate lending fell by 20 
percentage points between 2007 and 2008, after it had been growing at an average rate of 
approximately 10% a year in the previous decade (Franklin et al., 2019). 
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than increases in firms’ (borrowers’) risk. The authors estimate that credit supply 
shocks can account for between a third and a half of the fall in GDP relative to its 
historic trend. The banking crisis was accompanied by a sharp decline in economic 
activity6, with potentially long-lasting effects on U.K. firms’ productivity, innovation, 
and output.  
We investigate how the deterioration in banks’ health propagated through the 
U.K. economy. Specifically, we examine the direct effect of banks’ default risk on the 
probability of default of their corporate clients and the contagion that occurred across 
firms. To capture all potential propagation channels, we account for horizontal linkages 
between the firm and its competitors in the same industry, and for vertical linkages, 
both between the firm and its suppliers in upstream industries and between the firm and 
its customers in downstream industries. In addition, we identify trade credit (supplier 
trade credit and buyer trade credit) and contract specificity as significant characteristics 
of supply chains, which can either amplify or dampen the propagation of default risk.  
We collected a unique and comprehensive data set for the period 2005-2014, 
which links firms with their banks. The data set covers 259 banks operating in the U.K. 
and 332,060 client firms. To measure default risk, we compute estimates of time-
varying probabilities of default for each firm and bank in the data set using Standard & 
Poor’s PD Model and CreditPro data. In the absence of microeconomic data on supply-
chain links, we rely on ONS Input-Output tables for all U.K. industries to examine the 
propagation of default risk.  
Our results can be summarized as follows7. A 1.5pp (one standard deviation) 
increase in a bank’s default probability is associated on average with a 0.05pp increase 
in the default probability of its direct corporate clients – corresponding to a 0.51% 
increase in average default risk. The effect of a bank’s default risk is transmitted 
through upstream, downstream, and horizontal linkages.  First, a 1.5pp increase in the 
weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s suppliers (downstream 
spillovers) is associated on average with a 1.82pp increase in the firm’s default 
probability – corresponding to a 17.15% increase in average default risk. Second, a 
1.5pp increase in the weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s 
 
6 U.K. GDP fell by 0.5% and 4.2% in 2008 and 2009 respectively, and unemployment rose from 5.4% 
in 2008 to a peak of 8% in 2012 (World Bank Development Indicators). 
7 Here we only report the results from the regressions that include the largest set of explanatory 
variables, namely direct effects and all indirect effects (horizontal, upstream, and downstream). 
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customers (upstream spillovers) is associated on average with a 0.17pp increase in the 
firm’s default probability – corresponding to a 1.64% increase in average default risk. 
The downstream effects dominate in magnitude and significance, in line with the 
previous literature. Finally, the horizontal effects are negative. In other words, a firm 
benefits from an increase in the default risk of its competitors’ banks. A 1.5pp increase 
in the weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s competitors is 
associated on average with a 0.96pp decrease in the firm’s own default probability – 
corresponding to a 9% decrease in average default risk. Our results indicate that the 
spillover effects are much larger than the direct effects. In other words, the banking 
crisis of 2007-2008 affected the non-financial business sector well beyond the direct 
impact of banks’ default risk on their corporate clients. 
Next, we turn to the role of factors that may either dampen or strengthen 
contagion. First, the role of trade credit varies depending on whether the shock is 
upstream or downstream. We find that the downstream spillovers from a firm’s 
suppliers are stronger when a firm’s suppliers operate in an industry with relatively high 
accounts receivable. If a firm’s suppliers usually offer high levels of trade credit, an 
increase in their banks’ default risk (that constrains their own access to credit) will also 
reduce the volume of trade credit they are able to offer to their customers. In other 
words, trade credit magnifies the downstream spillovers. The downstream spillover 
effects stand at 1.65pp – corresponding to a 15.61% increase in average default risk. 
Trade credit increases this effect by 0.19pp (1.78%). By contrast, the upstream 
spillovers from a firm’s customers are dampened when a firm’s customers operate in 
an industry with relatively high accounts payable. If a firm’s customers usually receive 
significant amounts of trade credit, they can substitute trade credit for bank loans in the 
eventuality of credit rationing. In other words, trade credit dampens the upstream 
spillovers. The upstream spillover effects stand at 0.86pp – corresponding to a 8.12% 
increase in average default risk. Trade credit decreases this effect by 0.61pp (5.72%).  
Second, we examine the role of contract specificity. If the buyer has an arm’s 
length relationship with the supplier, the buyer can switch supplier relatively quickly 
and at a low cost. In this case, a shock to the supplier may not significantly affect the 
buyer. By contrast, if  a buyer signed specific contracts for idiosyncratic products with 
a supplier, then a shock to the supplier’s bank that significantly affects the supplier may 
be transmitted to the buyer as well. We find evidence supporting this hypothesis using 
Rauch’s (1999) classification of industries. Specifically, contract specificity amplifies 
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the downstream effects by between 0.35pp (conservative classification) and 0.73pp 
(liberal classification). These estimates correspond to a 3.3% and 6.86% additional 
increase in average default risk, respectively. 
Finally, in robustness tests we take into account the spatial distribution of 
supplier-customer relationships. Microeconomic data on supply-chain links is not 
available for the U.K., which is what motivates the use of Input-Output tables. One 
caveat of the approach is that it implicitly assumes that transportation and transaction 
costs are the same between all suppliers and customers and the target firm, regardless 
of where these suppliers and customers are located. In reality, however, we expect that 
most firms will develop local networks of suppliers and customers, with lower levels 
of interaction with firms at larger distances. We use a weighting matrix which assigns 
a weight of one to firms in the same region, 0.5 to firms in neighboring regions, and 
zero to firms in distant regions. As expected, the coefficients decrease in magnitude. 
The qualitative conclusions, however, are unchanged. The upstream spillovers are not 
significant, and the downstream spillovers stand at 0.39pp– corresponding to a 3.72% 
increase in average default risk. 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to exploit bank-level and 
firm-level data on probabilities of default to study the propagation of risk from banks 
to firms and across firms along supply chains in the U.K. Papers that look at the U.K. 
such as Anderson, Riley and Young (2019), Franklin et al. (2019), and Spatareanu et 
al. (2019) all focus on the direct effects of credit shocks and examine the bank lending 
channel. We are not aware of any paper which explores the bank risk channel in the 
U.K. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review 
of the related literature and highlights our contributions. Section 3 describes the data 
and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses our econometric strategy. 
Section 5 discusses the basic results and analyses the propagation of bank shocks 
through upstream, downstream, and horizontal linkages. Section 6 examines the role of 
trade credit and contract specificity in amplifying or dampening the impact of banks’ 
default risk. Section 7 performs robustness tests that take the spatial distribution of 






2. Related literature and contributions 
 
Our paper relates to three strands of literature. The first deals with the bank 
lending channel and the bank risk channel. The second deals with the transmission of 
shocks along supply chains. The third deals with credit chains and trade credit. 
Our work builds on the literature dealing with the transmission of banking 
shocks to the real economy. The largest strand of this literature is concerned with the 
bank lending channel. It shows that banks facing negative liquidity shocks or balance 
sheet difficulties curtail lending to their customers (see e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2008). 
The resulting credit supply shock has real consequences for borrowers along a wide 
range of dimensions, especially if the latter cannot easily switch to alternative sources 
of financing.  Recent papers analyze the employment and investment effects of credit 
shocks using firm-level bank-lender relations, such as pre-crisis connections with 
Lehman Brothers in the U.S. (Chodorow-Reich, 2014), Commerzbank in Germany 
(Huber, 2018) and Lloyds/RBS in the UK (Anderson, Riley and Young, 2019; Franklin 
et al., 2019).8 Other authors have looked at different outcome variables. For example, 
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) look at the impact of financial shocks on exports. Aghion 
et al. (2014) and Garicano and Steinwender (2016) stress the negative impact of 
financial shocks and financial constraints on productivity-enhancing investments (such 
as R&D). Spatareanu et al. (2019) illustrate the negative effects of credit frictions on 
U.K. firms’ patent quality, novelty and volume and its concentration in SMEs. The 
second strand of this literature examines the bank risk channel (Bersch et al., 2020), 
namely the impact of bank distress on the probability of default of their customers. 
Banks can affect the default risk of their clients in several ways, through the granting 
or denying of loans, the loan amounts, and other loan conditions (such as collateral 
requirements and covenants). Using a sample of German firms, Bersch et al. (2020) 
find that a distressed bank bailout leads to a bank-induced increase in firms’ 
probabilities of default. Moreover, bailouts tend to reduce trade credit availability and 
ultimately firms’ sales. Using a data set on 37,000 Danish non-financial firms, 
Abildgren et al. (2013) find that the probability of default during the crisis was 
significantly higher for firms with a “weak” bank than for comparable firms with a 
“sound” bank - even after controlling for differences in the credit quality of firms. The 
 
8 See also Acharya et al. (2015), Amiti and Weinstein (2018), Bentolila et al. (2018), Greenstone et al. 
(2014) and Manaresi and Pierri (2019). 
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literature on the bank risk channel is sparse, despite the importance of default risk for 
aggregate economic performance (see Besley et al., 2020). Our paper contributes to 
plugging a gap in this literature. We not only look at the direct impact of bank health 
on the default probability of their client firms, but more importantly also examine the 
indirect effects through default risk propagation along supply chains. We consider 
upstream, downstream and horizontal linkages. We find that propagation through 
supply chains contributes significantly to a firm’s probability of default. Therefore, the 
direct effects found in the literature significantly underestimate the total impact of 
shocks to banks’ health.  
The second area of related literature deals with the propagation of shocks within 
industries and along supply chains. This literature focusses on adverse events (such as 
bankruptcies, defaults, credit rating downgrades, and natural disasters) and examines 
their impact on firms that operate in the same industry as the affected firms (event firms) 
or are connected to the latter through supply-chain links. Cohen and Frazzini (2008), 
Menzly and Ozbas (2010), and Wu and Birge (2014) examine the impact on stock 
market valuations, and find that the equity market pays limited attention to supply 
chains. Hertzel and Officer (2012) examine the impact on loan spreads, and find higher 
spreads on loans in industries that are going through bankruptcy waves. Das, Duffie, 
Kapadia, and Saita (2007), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2010), and 
Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) provide empirical evidence for contagion in 
corporate bond defaults. Jorion and Zhang (2007) show that bankruptcy announcements 
affect the Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads of firms in the same industry. Agca et al. 
(2020) show that both favorable and unfavorable credit shocks propagate through 
supply chains in the CDS market.9 Researchers have studied how supply-chain 
characteristics, such as network centrality (Wu and Birge, 2014; and Yang and Zhang, 
2016), customer concentration (Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Zuo, 2017; and Campello 
and Gao, 2017), long-term relationships with principal customers (Cen et al., 2015), 
leverage and implied volatilities of customers and suppliers (Gencay et al., 2015), input 
specificity (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016),  network distances from event firms 
(Carvalho et al., 2016), trade credit and large sales exposures (Agca et al., 2020) affect 
the revenues, valuation, and creditworthiness of firms, and the propagation of shocks 
 
9 See also: Hertzel et al., 2008; Houston et al., 2016; Jacobson and von Schedvin, 2015; Chang, Hung, 
and Tsai, 2015; Chen, Zhang, and Zhang, 2016; Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian, 2016; Barrot and 
Sauvagnat, 2016; and Hendricks, Jacobs, and Singhal, 2017. 
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along supply chains. While it is related to our paper, this literature has a specific focus 
on the propagation of credit risk among non-financial businesses. We take a different 
angle by recognizing that supply-chain relationships can act as a propagation channel 
for bank shocks. In other words, they can amplify or dampen the bank risk channel. 
 The third area of related literature is that on credit chains and trade credit. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) suggest that a relatively small shock can amplify to a much 
larger one when firms borrow from, and lend to each other. In this light, Raddatz (2010) 
highlights the role of trade credit in amplifying industry output correlation using a 
cross-section of 43 countries and 370 industry groups. Several studies have investigated 
trade credit relationships as constituting a credit risk shock propagation channel. Jorion 
and Zhang (2009) show that a bankruptcy event experienced by a customer has a 
significant contemporaneous effect on the abnormal stock return and cumulative 
adjusted CDS spread change of the customer’s trade creditors. Boissay and Gropp 
(2013) show that firms facing payment defaults from their trade credit partners are more 
likely to default themselves if they are credit constrained. Jacobson and von Schedvin 
(2015) quantify the importance of trade credit chains for the propagation of corporate 
bankruptcy. They show that trade creditors experience significant losses due to trade 
debtor failures and that creditors’ bankruptcy risks increase in the size of incurred 
losses. Demir et al. (2019) find similar results investigating the effect of a trade credit 
supply shock using a change in import tax relief rules. Costello (2017) and Alfaro et al. 
(2019) suggest that bank shocks have significant effects on employment and sales via 
inter-firm propagation. In both cases trade credit acts as an amplifier of the shock. 
Focusing on the CDS market, Agca et al. (2020) show that trade credit amplifies the 
propagation of credit shocks through supply chains. We contribute to this literature by 
examining the role of trade credit in the propagation of banks’ default risk to firms’ 
default risk along supply chains. We provide a nuanced view of the role of trade credit 
in upstream and downstream propagation. We find that trade credit dampens upstream 








3. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1. Default risk 
 
We produce a unique and comprehensive data set, which links firms with their 
banks. The data set contains detailed information about the near universe of U.K. firms’ 
balance sheets and income statements, as well as information about their banks. We 
combine and match data from several sources. We start with Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis 
database, which provides firm-level information for the near universe of U.K. firms at 
an annual frequency. Our bank-level accounting data is from Capital IQ. We match 
firms to their banks using Amadeus Banker provided through WRDS. Most firms in 
our sample report only one bank and very few firms report relationships with more than 
one bank10. Our firm-bank linking file was downloaded in 2013. Ideally, we would have 
had access to a linking file for the first (pre-crisis) year in our sample. However, this is 
very unlikely to cause serious issues. Indeed, firm-bank relationships in the U.K. tend 
to be very sticky over time. In other words, firms seldom switch banks. This is 
supported by empirical studies on the U.K., e.g. Fraser (2009) and Franklin et al. (2019). 
Hubbard et al. (2002) and Slovin et al. (1993) argue that there are significant costs for 
firms to change their lending bank, and that therefore firms tend to stay with the same 
bank for a very long time. In addition, it is harder for firms to change banks during 
crisis episodes, as many banks experience distress at the same time (Amiti and 
Weinstein, 2011). 
We obtain estimates of firm-level probabilities of default from Besley et al. 
(2020). The authors use financial accounts data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis to 
estimate default risk using Standard and Poor’s PD Model and CreditPro data on 
historical default rates. Similarly, we use bank-level data from Capital IQ to compute 
the probabilities of default for the banks in our sample. PD Model is a tool which is 
widely used for firm-level credit scoring in financial markets. Similar to many other 
credit scoring tools, it uses a combination of financial accounts data, industry, and 
macroeconomic factors to assess the credit risk of a company. The scoring algorithm 
can be applied to private and publicly listed firms, and to financial and non-financial 
firms. PD Model generates a risk score (called “implied credit worthiness”) using 
 
10 The share of firms with multiple banks is less than 10%. To check the robustness of our results, we 
also performed our regressions after dropping firms which report having relationships with multiple 




S&P’s traditional rating symbols, corresponding to 21 bins of risk scores (from AAA 
to C). These risk scores are combined with historical information on default rates for 
each bin in each time period from S&P’s CreditPro. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on default risk 
 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bank PD (%) 1,256,174 2.56 1.46 0.00 21.54 
Firm PD (%) 1,256,174 10.6 12.95 0.05 66.67 
 
We present the summary statistics for default risk in Table 1. Noticeably, the 
mean, standard deviation, and range of banks’ probabilities of default are much smaller 
than those of firms. This is to be expected, as the banking industry is one of the most 
regulated industries and the level of risk assumed by banks is under the scrutiny of the 
Financial Services Authority and since 2013 the Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Systemically important financial institutions in the U.K. also benefit from implicit 
Government guarantees. Exemplary of this fact were the nationalizations and bank 
support schemes arising from the 2007-2008 crisis. Schich and Lindh (2012) provide a 
summary of the research on the value of implicit guarantees and estimate a sizeable 
borrowing cost premium arising from implicit guarantees ranging from 0.8 % to 3.2% 
over 2007-2012 for the U.K. This amounts to savings due to this guarantee of 0.4% of 
GDP. A similar estimate is found in Haldane (2010) of a 1.5% to 4% reduction in 
borrowing costs for a sample of 16 banks and building societies covering 2007-2009. 
At the same time, banks may have better control over their risk levels than non-financial 
firms, due to the diversification of their commercial loans portfolios over industries 
and, for most of the banks in our sample, over different geographies.  
Despite the fact that average default risk appears rather low among banks, the 
financial crisis caused a sharp rise in probabilities of default. The average default risk 
of banks increased from 0.92% in 2006 to 2.19% in 2009. This 1.27pp increase 
corresponds to a 138% increase in average default risk for banks serving U.K. firms. 
This is an economically significant shock. In our empirical analysis, we use a one 
standard deviation increase (1.5pp) to quantify our results.  
Credit scores and the associated probabilities of default have been used in the 
literature on the bank risk channel, as exemplified in Bersch et al. (2020). The authors 
use data from Creditreform, the largest credit rating agency in Germany. The use of 
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S&P’s PD Model is attractive for several reasons. First, it enables us to estimate a credit 
score for the near universe of U.K. firms even when data from balance sheet and income 
statements are scarce. This is important because the U.K. economy is dominated by 
small private firms, with limited reporting requirements. We can compute the 
probability of default for a much larger sample of firms than we could, for example, 
using a Merton model. Second, scoring tools like S&P’s PD Model are routinely used 
by financial market participants, including banks and analysts, to assess the credit risk 
of companies. Using such a tool for our research ensures that our estimates of default 
risk reflect perceptions by actual market participants. Third, S&P’s PD Model uses a 
broad definition of default that is in line with the Basel III regulatory requirements. 
Bankruptcy only represents one among many default events that enter the estimation of 
probabilities of default11. Bankruptcy is an adverse credit risk event which suits itself 
to event-studies, but it only represents a minority of default events. Finally, S&P’s PD 
Model takes into account not only financial risk, but also business risk when estimating 
default risk. Financial risk assesses each company’s credit worthiness based on 
financial ratios. On the other hand, business risk captures characteristics linked to the 
business environment, country risk, macroeconomic environment and a company’s 
competitiveness. Two companies with identical financial metrics can be assigned with 
different probabilities of default, to the extent that their business challenges and 
prospects differ. 
 
3.2. Input-Output linkages 
 
As our aim is to investigate not only the propagation of shocks from banks to 
their direct customer firms, but also through upstream and downstream linkages with 
suppliers and buyers, we use Input-Output matrices that capture the linkages of the 
U.K.’s production networks. We use annual data from the U.K.’s Input–Output tables 
for the period 2005-2014, obtained from the Office for National Statistics12. We use IO 
matrices to calculate linkages with upstream suppliers and downstream buyers, as well 
as horizontal linkages between the firm and its competitors in the same industry. To do 
so, we draw inspiration from methods in the FDI literature (see e.g.  Javorcik and 
 
11 See Appendix for the definition of default used by S&P’s PD Model. 
12https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/supplyandusetables/datasets/inputoutputsupplyan
dusetables - downloaded on February 21st , 2019.  
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Spatareanu, 2008, and Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011). Specifically, we start by 
computing a weighted average probability of default of the banks that serve firms in 
each industry j for each year t in the sample (𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , ). We use firms’ total assets to 
build the weights13. We exclude firm i when computing the weighted average of banks’ 
probabilities of default when firm i from industry j buys inputs from its own industry j 
(WA_PDij,t). These weighted averages are given in equations (2) and (3) below. 
 
(1)  𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , = ∑
,
∑ ,   
   × 𝑃𝐷_𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 ,  
 
(2)  𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , = ∑
,
∑ ,   






where toas ,  stands for the total assets of firm l in year t, and 𝑃𝐷_𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 ,  is the 
probability of default of the bank that is serving firm l in year t.  
We then use the coefficients from the IO tables to aggregate these industry-level 
weighted averages into upstream and downstream spillovers for each firm. The variable 
Downstream Spilloversi,t aggregates the weighted average probability of default of the 
banks serving the industries of firm i’s suppliers in year t. Similarly, the variable 
Upstream Spilloversi,t aggregates the weighted average probability of default of the 
banks serving the industries of firm i’s customers in year t. To sum up, we define 
Downstream Spilloversi,t  and Upstream Spilloversi,t in equations (3) and (4) as follows: 
 
(3) 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 , = 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , + ∑ 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 ,  
 
(4) 𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 , = 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , + ∑ 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 ,  
 
The variable IO , ,  corresponds to the share of inputs bought from industry s to supply 
industry j in year t and ∑ IO , , = 1.  These coefficients are obtained from the yearly 
U.K. Input-Output Tables. Finally, the variable 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 ,  defined in equation (2) is a 
weighted average of banks’ probabilities of default for all the competitors of firm i in 
 
13 While other variables can be used to build the weights, total assets are available for all the firms in 
our sample. It is crucial that our sample reflects the population of firms as closely as possible. We 
therefore use total assets to maximize the sample size. 
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industry j in year t. It therefore captures horizontal spillovers and we denote it with 
Horizontal Spilloversi,t. 
 
3.3. Trade credit 
 
We build two variables to capture the impact of trade credit on the propagation 
of banks’ default risk through supply chains, namely Upstream Trade Credit Effects 
and Downstream Trade Credit Effects. Upstream Trade Credit Effects is constructed as 
an interaction term between upstream spillovers and an index of the intensity of trade 
credit received by customers from their suppliers. Analogously, Downstream Trade 
Credit Effects is constructed as an interaction term between downstream spillovers and 
an index of the intensity of trade credit offered by suppliers to their customers. In the 
case of downstream spillovers, we build an industry-level  trade credit index based on 
the ratio of accounts receivable to sales for each upstream firm, following Raddatz 
(2010). In the case of upstream spillovers, we build an industry-level  trade credit index 
based on the ratio of accounts payable to sales for each downstream firm.  
To build the variable Downstream Trade Credit Effects, we first compute the 
median ratio of accounts receivable to sales for each firm i in industry j across years, 
tcrj,i. We then compute the median of tcrj,i at the industry level, tcrj, and divide it by the 
median ratio of accounts receivable to sales for the entire economy, tcre. The trade credit 
index for accounts receivable for industry j is thus defined as TCrj = tcrj/tcre. If the TCrj 
index is greater than one, then suppliers in industry j offer relatively large amounts of 
trade credit to their customers in the form of accounts receivable. We multiply this trade 
credit index by the weighted average of suppliers’ banks’ probabilities of default for 
each industry j. The trade credit index for Upstream Trade Credit Effects is built in the 
same way, but is based on the ratio of accounts payable to sales. It is defined as TCpj = 
tcpj/tcpe. If the TCpj index is greater than one, then customers in industry j receive 
relatively large amounts of trade credit from their suppliers in the form of accounts 
payable. We multiply this trade credit index by the weighted average of customers’ 
banks’ probabilities of default for each industry j. Finally, we use the coefficients from 
the IO tables to aggregate these interaction terms. The final variables Downstream 





(5) 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 , = 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , × 𝑇𝐶 +
∑ 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , × 𝑇𝐶  
 
(6) 𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 , = 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , × 𝑇𝐶 +
∑ 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , × 𝑇𝐶  
 
3.4. Contract specificity 
Another potential channel for the amplification or mitigation of shocks is the 
degree of contract specificity. If a customer has an arm’s length relationship with a 
supplier, then a shock to the supplier may not significantly affect the buyer, as the latter 
can switch to another supplier relatively quickly and at low cost. By contrast, if the 
buyer signed specific contracts for idiosyncratic products with a supplier, then a shock 
to the supplier’s bank that significantly affects the supplier may be transmitted to the 
buyer as well.  
In order to examine the impact of contract specificity on the propagation of 
default risk, we rely on Rauch (1999) who distinguishes between industries that use an 
organized exchange to sell their products, industries whose products are reference 
priced in trade publications and industries with differentiated products that may require 
the use of specific contracts for trade. We build indices for contract specificity based 
on Rauch’s classification of industries14. Rauch proposed a Conservative classification 
of industries, which maximizes the number of industries with product differentiation; 
and a Liberal  classification, which minimizes the number of industries with product 
differentiation15. Therefore, we construct two indices for contract specificity - CSc  for 
the Conservative classification and CSl for the Liberal classification. A list of U.K. 
industries with the corresponding indices according to both the Conservative and 
Liberal measures is given in Appendix Table A1. 
We use these indices to build interaction terms with the downstream effects 
from suppliers to customers. Specifically, we construct the variable Downstream 
Contract Specificity Effects (Conservative) in equation (8)  
 
14 Rauch’s classification is at the  4-digit SITC level. We aggregate industries to the 2-digit U.K. SIC 
classification that it is used by the ONS for the U.K.’s IO tables. 
15 “Because ambiguities arose that were sometimes sufficiently important to affect the classification at 
the three- or four-digit level, both “conservative” and “liberal” classifications were made, with the 
former minimizing the number of three- and four– digit commodities that are classified as either 




(8) 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 , , = 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , × 𝐶𝑆 +
∑ 𝐼𝑂 , , × 𝑊𝐴_𝑃𝐷 , × 𝐶𝑆  
 
 
The variable Downstream Contract Specificity Effects (Liberal) is constructed 




We use the following baseline specification to examine the relationship between 
a firm’s probability of default, the probability of default of its own lender, and the 
horizontal, downstream, and upstream spillovers from the probabilities of default of the 
banks of competitor firms, suppliers and customers: 
 
Firm_PDit= α + β1 Bank_PDi,t-1 + β2 Horizontal Spilloversi,t-1 + β3 Downstream 
Spilloversi,t-1 + β4 Upstream Spilloversi,t-1 + πi+ µj,t  + εi,k,t 
 
We allow for a time lag in the transmission of default risk and regress a firm’s 
probability of default (PD) in year t on its lender’s PD and spillover effects in year t-1. 
We expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the bank’s probability 
of default if there is a bank risk channel. We expect to find positive and significant 
coefficients on both Upstream Spilloversi,t-1 and Downstream Spilloversi,t-1, if default 
risk propagates along supply-chain links. By contrast, we expect a negative coefficient 
on Horizontal Spilloversi,t-1, as firms benefit from weakened competition. 
We face three econometric challenges. The first econometric concern is that, to 
identify a bank risk channel, we need to control for demand-related factors that affect a 
firm’s default risk. All regressions include firm fixed effects to account for all firm-
specific time-invariant factors that affect a firm’s default risk (as in Khwaja and Mian, 
2008, for example). We also include industry-year fixed effects to account for any other 
industry and year specific shocks that affect firms’ default risk.  The inclusion of firm 
fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects allows us to control for firm-specific 
demand factors, and to capture the bank-induced (supply-driven) effect on firms’ 
probabilities of default. Due to our propensity score matching methodology (see 
below), we have an adequate control group at the firm-level and do not need to control 
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for firm characteristics for identification of the bank-induced effect. Errors are robust 
following Amiti and Weinstein (2011). 
The second concern is that of reverse causality. Arguably, an increase in a firm’s 
probability of default may affect the quality of the commercial loans portfolio of its 
lender, thereby increasing the latter’s probability of default. If this is the case, changes 
in firms’ default risk lead to changes in banks’ default risk rather than the other way 
around. Recent contributions on the U.K. such as Franklin et al. (2019) argue that such 
reverse causation seems unlikely in practice. The authors present narrative evidence 
that the main cause of variability in banks’ performance after the crisis was not their 
corporate lending decisions (except for those related to commercial real estate). In 
addition, Barnett and Thomas (2014) suggest that the majority of the decline in 
corporate lending in the U.K. was due to a contraction in supply rather than increases 
in firm risk. Despite a relatively large literature analyzing the global financial crisis, as 
Chodorow-Reich (2014) notes, none of these papers make a connection between the 
initial impulse of the crisis and the corporate loan portfolios of banks16. Dimsdale 
(2009) contends that the inability of British banks to access the interbank market, rather 
than distress in banks’ commercial loans portfolios, led to the high-profile Northern 
Rock nationalization and the rescue of HBOS. Since the origins of the banking crisis 
were not linked to the corporate loan market, reverse causation seems unlikely to be a 
major factor that may introduce endogeneity in our tests. Nevertheless, we follow 
Franklin et al. (2019) and exclude financial and real estate industries from our sample 
to omit the major potential source of reverse causation.  
The final concern is the possibility that banks with higher default risk are 
selecting different types of borrowers than banks with lower default risk. To account 
for the possibility of selection on observables, we use propensity score matching 
(PSM). This enables us to investigate whether changes in the default risk of otherwise 
similar firms are caused by differences in their banks’ default risk after the crisis. We 
match the firms whose banks were the most likely to default in 2005, specifically the 
firms whose banks were in the top quartile of the bank default risk distribution (the 
treatment group), with firms in the remaining quartiles - whose banks were less likely 
 
16 Chodorow-Reich (2014) identifies several causes for the Great Recession that were explored in the 




to default (the control group).17  We use the treatment group dummy as the dependent 
variable in a logit model to generate the propensity score using default risk, size 
(measured by total assets), and total revenue of the firms as independent variables. With 
the predicted probabilities from the logit model, we then perform a propensity score 
matching procedure with replacement, matching each firm from the treatment group 
with a firm from the control group in the same industry in the pre-sample year (2005). 
We separate the sample into two groups of firms with similar characteristics before the 
sample period (i.e. firms in the same industry, having similar default risk, size, and 
revenues) that differ only in the level of default risk of their respective banks. This 
procedure enables us to examine whether differences in the default risk of otherwise 
similar firms after the crisis are due to differences in their banks’ default risk. Table 2 
reports summary statistics on the size (total assets), total revenues, and probability of 
default of firms in the control and treatment groups. The t-tests demonstrate that the 
null hypotheses of identical group means cannot be rejected. 
Table 2: Comparative summary statistics for the control and the treatment groups 





Mean  t-statistic p-value 
Total assets 129,319 5.46 5.70 1.11 0.266 
PD firm 129,319 0.08 0.07 -0.70 0.483 
Total revenue 129,319 8.23 8.40 0.35 0.730 
 
5. Empirical analysis of direct and indirect supply-chain effects 
 
5.1. Direct effects 
 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating the baseline specification without 
supply-chain spillovers: 
Firm_PDit= α + β Bank_PDi,t-1 + πi+ µj,t  + εi,k,t 
 
The variable of interest is the probability of default of the firm’s lender in year t-1 
(Bank_PDi,t-1). We expect the coefficient on the bank’s default risk to be positive and 
statistically significant if, indeed, a lender’s default risk negatively affects the default 
risk of its customers (through decreased credit availability). The results presented in 
 
17 The results are robust to using different cut-offs for the bank default risk distribution (e.g. redefining 
the treatment group using the top 15% and top 50% of the bank default risk distribution).  
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Table 3 confirm our expectations. Column (1) presents the results without PSM and 
Column (2) the results with PSM. Since we matched the firms from the treatment and 
control groups using the firms’ characteristics in the year 2005, our PSM estimations 
rely on data for the period 2006-2014. In both cases, the coefficient β is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. Column (1) indicates that a 1.5pp increase in a bank’s default 
probability is associated on average with a 0.06pp increase in the default probability of 
its direct corporate clients. This represents a 0.55% increase in default risk compared 
to the average probability of default of firms in the entire sample period (10.6%). The 
effect is substantially stronger in our favored specification with PSM: a 1.5pp increase 
in a bank’s default probability is associated on average with a 0.18pp increase in the 
default probability of its direct corporate clients. This corresponds to a 1.73% increase 
in the average default risk of firms. 
 
Table 3: Direct effects 
 (1) (2) 
 
Full sample PSM based on 2005 data 
    
VARIABLES Firm PDt Firm PDt 
   
Bank PDt-1 0.0391*** 0.122*** 
 [7.131] [14.91] 
   
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 2,525,206 1,684,779 
R-squared 0.001 0.004 
Notes: The errors are robust. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of regressions estimated on groups of firms with similar pre-crisis 
characteristics, which differ only in the health of their banks, confirm that shocks to 
banks’ default risk are transmitted to borrowing firms. These results are qualitatively in 
line with the results of Bersch et al. (2020) and Abildgren et al. (2013) as they uncover 
bank-induced increases in default risk (bank risk channel). However, our results are not 
straightforward to compare quantitatively with these two papers. In Bersch et al. (2020), 
the bank variable is a treatment dummy for a bank receiving a bailout, as opposed to a 
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continuous variable which measures the bank’s default risk as in our analysis. 
Abildgren et al. (2013) use a different definition of default, namely “exit by default”, 
which specifically refers to bankruptcy or dissolution. Our definition of default 
encompasses a wide range of default events as classified by S&P’s. 
 
5.2. Upstream, downstream, and horizontal linkages 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, an increase in a bank’s default risk 
may directly affect the probability of default of its corporate borrowers. However, this 
direct effect may substantially underestimate the overall impact of bank distress on the 
economy as it ignores the fact that firms are embedded in production networks which 
may propagate shocks from suppliers to customers, from customers to suppliers and 
among competitors.  In this section, we estimate the full specification with direct and 
indirect (spillover) effects using our preferred estimation with PSM: 
 
Firm_PDit= α + β1 Bank_PDi,t-1 + β2 Horizontal Spilloversi,t-1 + β3 Downstream 
Spilloversi,t-1 + β4 Upstream Spilloversi,t-1 + πi+ µj,t  + εi,k,t 
 
The downstream spillovers capture the impact of changes in the default risk of 
the banks that serve a firm’s suppliers, whereas the upstream spillovers capture the 
impact of changes in the default risk of the banks that serve a firm’s customers. The 
horizontal spillovers capture the impact of changes in the default risk of banks that serve 
a firm’s competitors. The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) examines 
downstream spillovers. As expected, the coefficient is positive and significant. A 1.5pp 
increase in the weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s suppliers 
is associated on average with a 0.99pp increase in the firm’s default probability – 
corresponding to a 9.38% increase in average default risk. Column (2) considers 
upstream spillovers. Again, the coefficient is significantly positive, as expected. A 
1.5pp increase in the weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s 
customers is associated on average with a 0.93pp increase in the firm’s default 
probability – corresponding to a 8.75% increase in average default risk. In column (3), 
we include upstream and downstream linkages in one regression, and add horizontal 
linkages. The coefficients on upstream and downstream linkages remain significant and 
retain the expected signs. However, the magnitude of the downstream spillovers 
increases substantially (from 0.99pp to 1.82pp), while that of upstream spillovers 
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decreases substantially (from 0.93pp to 0.17pp). The downstream and upstream 
spillovers now correspond to a 17.15% and 1.64% increase in average default risk, 
respectively. In addition, the coefficient on upstream spillovers decreases in statistical 
significance. Overall, the results suggest that firms’ default risk increases on average in 
response to increases in the default risk of the banks of their suppliers and customers. 
This suggests that a deterioration in banks’ health is propagated along the supply chain 
and that the direct effects substantially underestimate the overall impact on the real 
economy. In addition, the horizontal effects are negative. In other words, a firm benefits 
from an increase in the default risk of its competitors’ banks. A 1.5pp increase in the 
weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s competitors is 
associated on average with a 0.96pp decrease in the firm’s own default probability – 
corresponding to a 9% decrease in average default risk. 
 
Table 4: Indirect effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Firm PD Firm PD Firm PD 
    
Bank PDt-1 0.0320*** 0.0390*** 0.0358*** 
 [3.690] [4.517] [4.123] 
Upstream Spilloverst-1  0.618*** 0.116* 
  [16.47] [1.663] 
Downstream spilloverst-1 0.663***  1.212*** 
 [17.15]  [14.57] 
Horizontal Spilloverst-1   -0.642*** 
   [-12.21] 
    
    
Industry-year fixed effects yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,632,435 1,632,435 1,632,435 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: The errors are robust. We use propensity score matching based on data from the year 2005 to 
match firms from the treatment group (borrowing from distressed banks) with firms from the control 
group (borrowing from non-distressed banks). Due to the use of PSM, our data set starts in 2006 and 






The results are qualitatively in line with those obtained by Alfaro et al. (2019) 
who use Spanish data to estimate the real effects of bank lending shocks and how they 
permeate the economy through buyer-supplier linkages. The authors estimate upstream 
and downstream effects on employment, output, and investment. Our paper 
distinguishes itself from theirs in that we consider the impact of bank shocks on firms’ 
default risk, as opposed to employment, output, or investment. However, our results are 
qualitatively in line with theirs in several ways. First, a higher probability of default is 
negatively correlated with firm performance, including employment, output, and 
investment (see e.g. Besley et al., 2020). Second, the authors find that downstream 
effects dominate the upstream effects in significance and magnitude, which is 
consistent with our results in column 3 of Table 4.18 Finally, they find that the indirect 
effects are larger than the direct effects. Again, this is consistent with our results and 
indicates that studies that focus on direct effects might severely underestimate the 
overall impact of deteriorating bank health on the economy. 
 




Trade credit is a significant component of the capital structure of firms (see e.g. 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995, and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). As Raddatz  
(2010) observes, trade credit may facilitate the transmission of shocks through the 
economy. Credit shocks experienced by suppliers may reduce the volume of trade credit 
they are able to offer to their customers (Coricelli and Masten, 2004, Costello, 2017). 
This exacerbates the problems of production bottlenecks faced by the customers of the 
affected suppliers. It can thus be argued that trade credit may amplify the downstream 
propagation of bank shocks in production networks. On the other hand, customers that 
continuously use trade credit with the same suppliers may enjoy a special relationship 
with them. If these customers face a credit shortage due to a deterioration in the health 
of their own banks, they can use trade credit from their suppliers as a partial substitute 
for bank loans. Therefore, trade credit may dampen upstream spillovers. Our data set 
enables us to examine both of these hypotheses. 
 
18 They find that upstream effects are insignificant for both employment and investment, and that they 
are significant but smaller than the downstream effects for output. 
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We present our results in Table 5. The coefficients on the lagged default risk of 
banks (direct effects) and lagged upstream and downstream linkages remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level and retain the expected signs. In line with our expectations, 
the coefficients on Upstream Trade Credit effects are statistically significant and 
negative, whereas the coefficients on Downstream Trade Credit effects are statistically 
significant and positive. In other words, we find evidence that trade credit dampens 
upstream spillovers but amplifies downstream spillovers.  
 
Table 5: The role of trade credit in default risk contagion 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Firm PDt Firm PDt Firm PDt Firm PDt Firm PDt 
      
Bank PDt-1 0.0377*** 0.0315*** 0.0350*** 0.0347*** 0.0341*** 
 [4.361] [4.909] [5.457] [5.417] [5.323] 
Upstream 
Spilloverst-1 1.034***  0.121** 0.578*** 0.574*** 
 [12.08]  [2.301] [7.765] [7.708] 
Upstream Trade 
Credit Effectst-1 -0.389***   -0.410*** -0.404*** 
 [-5.495]   [-8.748] [-8.585] 
Downstream 
Spilloverst-1  0.572*** 1.061*** 1.208*** 1.103*** 
  [8.502] [11.89] [19.76] [12.34] 
Downstream 
Trade Credit 
effectst-1  0.109 0.181**  0.126* 
  [1.407] [2.325]  [1.608] 
Horizontal 
effectst-1   -0.647*** -0.661*** -0.664*** 
   [-17.04] [-17.40] [-17.46] 
      
      
Industry-year 
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,632,435 1,632,435 1,632,435 1,632,435 1,632,435 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: The errors are robust. We use propensity score matching based on data from the year 2005 to 
match firms from the treatment group (borrowing from distressed banks) with firms from the control 
group (borrowing from non-distressed banks). Due to the use of PSM, our data set starts in 2006 and 




We focus on the full specification in column (5) of Table 5. A 1.5pp increase in 
the weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s customers (upstream 
spillovers) is associated on average with a 0.86pp increase in the firm’s default 
probability – corresponding to a 8.12% increase in average default risk. Trade credit 
decreases this effect by 0.61pp (5.72%). A 1.5pp increase in the weighted average 
probability of default of the banks of a firm’s suppliers (downstream spillovers) is 
associated on average with a 1.65pp increase in the firm’s default probability – 
corresponding to a 15.61% increase in average default risk. Trade credit increases this 
effect by 0.19pp (1.78%). 
 
The existing literature has mainly focused on the amplifying role of trade credit. 
For example, Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015) show that trade creditors experience 
significant trade credit losses due to trade debtor failures and that creditors’ bankruptcy 
risks increase in the size of incurred losses. These effects are upstream spillovers. 
Costello (2017) highlights contagion in the other direction, from suppliers to customers. 
She finds that suppliers exposed to a large decline in bank financing reduce the volume 
of trade credit extended to customers, and that customers linked to such liquidity-
constrained suppliers suffer deteriorations in both credit quality and employment. 
These effects are downstream spillovers, also examined in Alfaro et al. (2019). Our 
analysis distinguishes itself from this previous literature in that it provides a more 
nuanced picture of the role of trade credit, with the possibility that trade credit may 
dampen the propagation of default risk through supply chains. Our finding that trade 
credit amplifies downstream effects is in line with the previous literature. When 
suppliers are hit by a bank shock, they are likely to reduce the amount of trade credit 
they provide to their customers. Our finding that trade credit dampens upstream 
spillovers is in line with the idea that trade credit and bank credit are to some extent 
substitutes. In general, the literature has struggled to provide empirical evidence of this 
substitutability. Huang et al. (2011), however, find convincing evidence that this 
substitutability exists, by distinguishing between  periods of rapid growth and periods 
of slow growth. They find evidence that the pattern of substitution is counter-cyclical 
with respect to GDP. In other words, there is a decline in the substitution effect when 
the economic cycle evolves from a slow-growth phase to a rapid-growth one. This 
might explain why the previous literature, which does not take cyclicality into account, 
generally fails to uncover substitution. As our sample period encompasses the financial 
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crisis and its immediate aftermath, it is a period of slow growth and tight bank credit. 
Our results are likely to be driven by the high degree of substitutability between trade 
credit and bank credit during such times. 
 
6.2. Contract specificity 
 
Another important aspect of supply-chain relationships is how “sticky” they are. 
Contract specificity is an important factor in determining this degree of stickiness. If a 
buyer has an arm’s length relationship with a supplier, then any shock to the supplier 
may not significantly affect the buyer, since the buyer can switch to another supplier 
relatively quickly and at low cost. By contrast, if the buyer signed specific contracts for 
idiosyncratic products with a supplier, a shock to the supplier’s bank that significantly 
affects the supplier may be transmitted to the buyer. The buyer must pay additional 
search costs to find a new supplier on top of the costs of negotiating a new contract, all 
of these potentially under time pressure. 
 We use the classification of Rauch (1999) to identify industries with 
differentiated products that are traded using specific contracts. As described earlier, we 
build two indices for contract-specific industries according to Rauch’s conservative and 
liberal classifications of industries, denoted CSc and CSl respectively. We use them to 
build interaction terms with the downstream effects from suppliers to customers. 
Specifically, we construct the variables Downstream Contract Specificity Effects 
(Conservative) and  Downstream Contract Specificity Effects (Liberal) and add these 
two variables to our regressions. The results are presented in Table 6.  
Except for the coefficient in column (1) which is barely significant, the 
coefficients on Downstream Contract Specificity Effects (Conservative) and 
Downstream Contract Specificity Effects (Liberal) are significantly positive, and robust 
to including the other linkages (i.e. horizontal and upstream). The results are actually 
stronger when we add the Horizontal Spillovers and the Upstream Spillovers variables 
in columns (2) and (4). Specifically, contract specificity amplifies the effect of a 1.5pp 
increase in the default risk of the banks’ of a firm’s suppliers (downstream effects) by 
between 0.35pp (conservative classification) and 0.73pp (liberal classification). These 
estimates correspond to a 3.3% and 6.86% additional increase in average default risk, 
respectively. The coefficients on all the linkages themselves remain significant and 
have the expected signs. These findings support the idea that contract specificity 
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between suppliers and buyers amplifies the propagation of banking shocks through 
production networks.  
Our results are qualitatively in line with Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) who find 
that suppliers affected by natural disasters impose substantial output losses on their 
customers (downstream effects), especially when they produce specific inputs. In other 
words, they show that input specificity is a key driver of the propagation of firm-level 
shocks. Among others, they also use the Rauch (1999) classification. 
 
Table 6: The Role of contract specificity in default risk contagion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Firm PDt Firm PDt Firm PDt Firm PDt 
     
Bank PDt-1 0.0319*** 0.0357*** 0.0317*** 0.0355*** 
 [4.991] [5.580] [4.962] [5.541] 
Upstream Spilloverst-1  0.137***  0.135** 
  [2.576]  [2.574] 
Downstream 
Spilloverst-1 0.645*** 1.167*** 0.638*** 1.167*** 
 [31.42] [18.28] [31.85] [18.85] 
Horizontal Spilloverst-1  -0.647***  -0.670*** 
  [-17.04]  [-17.46] 
Downstream Contract 
Specificity Effects          
(Conservative)t-1 0.144# 0.233**   
 [1.520] [2.417]   
Downstream Contract 
Specificity Effects 
(Liberal)t-1   0.223** 0.485*** 
   [2.230]  
     
Industry-year fixed 
effects yes yes Yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes Yes yes 
Observations 1,632,435 1,632,435 1,632,435 1,632,435 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: The errors are robust. We use propensity score matching based on data from the year 2005 to 
match firms from the treatment group (borrowing from distressed banks) with firms from the control 
group (borrowing from non-distressed banks). Due to the use of PSM, our data set starts in 2006 and 






7. Accounting for geographical distance in the supply chain 
 
Our use of Input-Output tables is motivated by the fact that we do not have 
access to microeconomic data on supplier-customer relationships for U.K. firms. So 
far, the implicit assumption behind our estimates of vertical linkages (upstream and 
downstream) is that transportation costs and transaction costs between the firm and its 
suppliers and customers are constant regardless of where these suppliers and customers 
are located.19 However, both transportation and transaction costs are likely to be higher 
when dealing with distant customers and suppliers. Accordingly, firms typically prefer 
to form supply-chain relationships locally (see e.g. Duranton and Puga, 2004; 
Christopher, 2005; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016; Bernard, Moxnes, and Saito, 2019). In 
the case of Japan, Bernard, Moxnes, and Saito (2019) find that the median distance 
between suppliers and customers is a mere 30 kilometers. If these findings hold for the 
U.K. economy, shocks to the banks of more distant firms may not be fully transmitted 
to the target firm. Our estimates of Table 4 do not take the spatial distribution of firms 
into account, and might therefore overestimate the magnitude of default risk 
propagation. This section examines how taking distance into account affects our 
estimates of downstream and upstream spillovers. 
We divide the U.K. into 12 regions, using the EU’s NUTS1 classification20. The 
regions are listed in Appendix Table A2. Appendix Figure A1 shows the regional 
distribution of U.K. firms across the 12 regions in our sample. Note that London 
contains 20% of the firms in our data set, followed by its two neighboring regions, the 
South East and the East of England. Northern Ireland and the North East of England 
have around 2%, and Wales 3%, of the total number of firms in our data set. To examine 
whether the regional distribution of U.K. firms in our sample is representative, we 
compare it with the regional numbers of active firms from ONS statistics21. This 
comparison confirms that our data set is indeed representative of the regional 
distribution of U.K. firms (see Table 7).22  
 
19 Alternatively, we assume that transportation and transaction costs are negligible. 
20 NUTS stand for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, a system of geographical statistical 
units (regions) used by EU countries. The system was adopted by the EU in 2003 and it is administered 
by Eurostat in cooperation with each country. There are three hierarchical levels, with NUTS1 (the 
classification that we are using) representing the largest regions. 
21 Business Demography – 2018, the U.K. Office for National Statistics. 
22In addition, we use Kendall's rank test to check whether the two distributions are independent. We 
reject (with a p-value of 0.0001) the hypothesis that the regional distribution of firms from the ONS 
statistics and from our data set are independent.  
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Table 7: Regional distribution of firms (ONS surveys versus sample) 
UK regions (NUTS1) 
Regional share of active 
firms in 2014 from 
Business demographics, 
ONS (%) 
Regional share of 
active firms in our 
dataset (%) 
North East (England) 3 2 
North West (England) 10 10 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber 7 8 
East Midlands (England) 7 7 
West Midlands (England) 8 8 
East of England 10 10 
London 20 19 
South East (England) 16 15 
South West (England) 8 8 
Wales 4 3 
Scotland 7 6 
Northern Ireland 2 2 
 
In Appendix Table A3 we present the distances (in kilometers) between the 
centroids of the NUTS1 regions in the UK. The results show that almost all the 
distances between the regional centroids are larger than 100 kilometers, the exceptions 
being London and the South East, where the distance is 48 km23. Inter-regional 
distances in the U.K. are significantly larger than 30 km, the median distance between 
suppliers and customers estimated by Bernard, Moxnes, and Saito (2019) in Japan.  
Therefore, we expect that most firms will develop intra-regional networks of suppliers 
and customers, with lower levels of interaction with firms in neighboring and distant 
regions.  
We introduce a spatial effect in our regressions by assuming that firms are fully 
affected by the suppliers and customers from the same region, receive half of the impact 
from the suppliers and customers from neighboring regions, and are not affected at all 
 
 
23 Another distance smaller than 100 km is between the West and East Midlands (95 km). The regions 
of London, the South East and the East of England are geographically close and contain 45% of firms 
in our data set. 
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by suppliers and customers from more distant regions24. We reconstruct the spillover 
variables using these assumptions and replicate the regressions of Table 4. The results 
are presented in Table 8. The results are qualitatively in line with those of Table 4.  
Table 8: Vertical linkages when firms' supply chains are restricted to their own 
and neighboring regions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Firm PDt Firm PDt Firm PDt 
    
Bank PDt-1 0.0336*** 0.0281*** 0.0308*** 
 [3.763] [4.285] [4.640] 
 
Upstream Spillovers(local)t-1 0.215***  
 
0.0034 
 [17.49]  [0.159] 
Downstream spillovers(local)t-1  0.227*** 
 
0.263*** 
  [37.98] [11.79] 
 
Horizontal spillovers(local)t-1   
 
-0.071*** 
   [-4.065] 
    
Industry-year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes 
    
    
Observations 1,594,980 1,594,980 1,594,980 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: We compute the vertical linkages using only firms from the same region as the target firm (weight 
of 1) or from neighboring regions (weight 0.5). The firms from more distant regions have a weight of 0. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The coefficient on the lagged default risk of the firm’s lender (direct effect) 
remains positive and statistically significant. Column (1) shows that the upstream 
spillovers from the firm’s customers remain positive and statistically significant. A 
1.5pp increase in the weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s 
customers is associated on average with a 0.32pp increase in the firm’s default 
probability – corresponding to a 3% increase in average default risk. Column (2) shows 
a similar result for the downstream spillovers from suppliers. A 1.5pp increase in the 
weighted average probability of default of the banks of a firm’s suppliers is associated 
 
24 We use a spatial weighting matrix with a 0.5 weight for neighboring regions and 0 weight for distant 
regions, see also Kiyota (2020). As a robustness check, we used different weights and the results were 
similar to the results presented in Table 8. 
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on average with a 0.34pp increase in the firm’s default probability – corresponding to 
a 3.21% increase in average default risk. In column (3), we include both upstream and 
downstream spillovers. In this case, only the downstream spillovers remain 
significantly positive (at 0.39pp, or 3.72%). 
It is apparent that the size of the local upstream and downstream spillovers is 
much smaller than that of the overall spillovers in Table 4. Because we do not have 
access to microeconomic data on supply-chain linkages between firms, Table 8 
provides an evaluation of the role of distance in determining the size of the overall 
effects. Together, our results of Tables 4 and 8 provide a range for the magnitude of 
those overall effects. 
8. Conclusions 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 corresponded to a significant deterioration in 
the health of U.K. banks. How did this shock spread to the rest of the economy? We 
examine this question through the lens of default risk propagation from banks to firms, 
and across firms through supply-chain relationships. We providence evidence of 
significant contagion effects, and examine characteristics of supply chains that might 
either amplify or dampen propagation. Our results suggest that previous studies that 
focused on the direct effects of bank distress may severely underestimate the impact of 
bank shocks on the real economy. 
We construct a unique and extensive matched firm-bank data set that contains 
time-varying estimates of probabilities of default for banks and their client firms. We 
combine this data set with Input-Output tables from the ONS and draw inspiration from 
the FDI literature to shed new light on the transmission of the banking crisis to the 
business sector. 
Specifically, we analyze the direct as well as the indirect effects of a 
deterioration in bank health, as captured by increased default risk, on the default risk of 
firms. To fully capture the propagation of the banking crisis we account for horizontal 
linkages between the firm and its competitors in the same industry, and for vertical 
linkages between the firm and its suppliers in upstream industries and between the firm 
and its customers in downstream industries. We find evidence of substantial upstream 
and downstream effects, which outweigh the direct effects. In line with the previous 
literature, downstream spillovers dominate in size and significance. 
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 In addition, we identify trade credit and contract specificity as significant 
channels that either amplify or dampen the effect of the bank shocks on the real 
economy. First, the role of trade credit varies depending on whether the shock is 
upstream or downstream. We find that the downstream spillovers from a firm’s 
suppliers are stronger when a firm’s suppliers operate in industries with relatively high 
accounts receivable. In other words, trade credit magnifies the downstream spillovers. 
By contrast, the upstream spillovers from a firm’s customers are dampened when a 
firm’s customers operate in industries with relatively high accounts payable. In other 
words, trade credit dampens the upstream spillovers. Second, we find that contract 
specificity amplifies downstream spillovers.  
To conclude, we contribute to the literature on the bank risk channel by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of the U.K. experience and examining indirect 
effects that have previously been largely overlooked. Our method has the advantage 
that it can be applied to other countries where credit registry data and data on direct 
interfirm linkages are sparse. The method could also be adjusted to model the cross-
country transmission of financial shocks, given the availability of data on default risk 
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Definition of default in S&P’s PD Model 
 
“A default is considered to have occurred with regards to a particular obligor when 
either or both of the two following events has taken place:  
 
 The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to 
the banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as 
realizing security (if held).  
 The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to 
the banking group. Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the 
customer has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than 
current amount outstanding.  
 
The elements to be taken as indications of unlikeliness to pay include:  
 
 The bank puts the credit obligation on non-accrued status. 
 The bank makes a charge-off or account-specific provision resulting from a 
significant perceived decline in credit quality subsequent to the bank taking on 
the exposure.  
 The bank sells the credit obligation at a material credit-related economic loss.  
 The bank consents to a distressed restructuring of the credit obligation where 
this is likely to result in a diminished financial obligation caused by the material 
forgiveness, or postponement, of principal, interest or (where relevant) fees.  
 The bank has filed for the obligor’s bankruptcy or a similar order in respect of 
the obligor’s credit obligation to the banking group. 
 The obligor has sought or has been placed in bankruptcy or similar protection 






We consider that contract specific industries are producing a high proportion of 
differentiated products. Rauch (1999) distinguishes between industries that use an 
organized exchange to sell their products, industries whose products are reference 
priced in trade publications and industries with differentiated products that may require 
the use of specific contracts for trade. We build an index for contract specificity based 
on Rauch’s classification of industries. Specifically, we use a dummy variable equal to 
one for industries that Rauch classifies as trading differentiated products, and zero 
otherwise for industries at 3 or 4 digits SIC level of aggregation. We aggregate these 
indicators in an index of contract specificity for the classification of industry used by 
the ONS for the UK IO tables (UK SIC 2 digits). Rauch proposed a Conservative 
classification of industries, which maximizes the number of industries with product 
differentiation; and a Liberal classification, which minimizes the number of industries 
with product differentiation. Based on Rauch distinctions, we compute a Conservative 
and a Liberal version of the index of contract specificity. Note that Rauch classified 
only raw materials and manufacturing industries, therefore the index for contract 
specificity is restricted to the same categories. The results are in the following table. 
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Table A1: Index of contract specificity based on Rauch's classifications of 
industries 
Industry 
  (IO UK 
SIC 2 
digits)  
Index of contract 
specificity based on the 
conservative Rauch  
classification  
Index of contract 
specificity based on the  
liberal Rauch  
classification 
1 0.24 0.23 
2 0.57 0.57 
3 0.13 0.13 
9 0.33 0.00 
10 0.00 0.00 
11 0.25 0.15 
12 0.00 0.00 
13 0.00 0.00 
18 0.00 0.00 
19 0.23 0.22 
20 0.41 0.21 
21 0.87 0.80 
22 0.21 0.20 
23 0.12 0.09 
28 0.85 0.79 
29 1.00 1.00 
30 1.00 1.00 
31 1.00 1.00 
32 1.00 1.00 
33 1.00 1.00 
36 0.48 0.44 
37 1.00 1.00 
38 0.77 0.77 
39 0.30 0.30 











Table A2: UK NUTS1 regions 
Region number NUTS1 code UK regions 
1 UKC North East (England) 
2 UKD North West (England) 
3 UKE 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber 




6 UKH East of England 
7 UKI London 
8 UKJ South East (England) 
9 UKK South West (England) 
10 UKL Wales 
11 UKM Scotland 




























Table A.3: Distance (in km) between centroids of the NUTS1 regions in the UK 
 
Regions (NUTS1) North East  North West  Yorkshire  East Midlands West Midlands East of England London South East  South West Wales Scotland Northern Ireland 
North East (England) 0 116 155 284 307 371 434 431 515 389 172 337 
North West (England) 116 0 113 224 214 329 368 354 409 277 207 265 
Yorkshire and The Humber 155 113 0 130 165 223 279 277 382 276 303 370 
East Midlands (England) 284 224 130 0 95 111 150 150 293 229 427 445 
West Midlands (England) 307 214 165 95 0 188 176 149 218 134 419 384 
East of England 371 329 223 111 188 0 100 136 328 308 526 556 
London 434 368 279 150 176 100 0 48 245 262 574 559 
South East (England) 431 354 277 150 149 136 48 0 198 218 561 528 
South West (England) 515 409 382 293 218 328 245 198 0 142 598 476 
Wales 389 277 276 229 134 308 262 218 142 0 457 342 
Scotland 172 207 303 427 419 526 574 561 598 457 0 252 
Northern Ireland 337 265 370 445 384 556 559 528 476 342 252 0 
 
Notes: Distances computed using great-circle distance formula and geographical coordinates of regional centroids from the Office for National Statistics, UK. 
 
